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“According to Article 26 of the Labour Union Act, if
a strike would damage public interests, [the state] can
demand compulsory mediation. [...] Taiwan Railway
Labour Union broke the intention and spirit of Arti-
cle 26 of the Labour Union Act, using the holding of
a meeting as a disguised means of going on a strike;
this kind of law-skirting strike would hurt the image of
the union and the labourers.” (1)
Those who witnessed the rule of Taiwan by the Na-tionalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) for over fivedecades before 2000 would not have felt surprised
to hear the words quoted above, had they come from the
KMT—it had been hostile to labour unions and had prohib-
ited all labour movements until Martial Law was lifted in
1987. However the above-quoted newsletter was in fact dis-
tributed to the press by the Central Office of the Demo-
cratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2003, when it was the
ruling party in Taiwan. The cited remark came from the
party’s Deputy Secretary General, who was criticising the
intended strike by locomotive drivers of the Taiwan Railway
during the Mid-Autumn Festival holidays, as called by the
Taiwan Railway Labour Union (Taitie gonghui). The
deputy Secretary General became the Director of the
Labour Affairs Council in a later cabinet reshuffling under
the DPP regime. The fact that once in power the DPP’s re-
action to a potential strike was indistinguishable from
KMT’s shows the shared mentality of the ruling elites. To
call off the potential strike, the ruling regime would on the
one hand assert the illegality of the strike, and on the other
hand use a self-assumed public disapproval to show the un-
popularity of the movement. However, no one ever studied
the actual reactions of the general public toward labour
unions, labour movements, or other related issues.
The first Labour Union Law was implemented in Taiwan in
1929 during the Japanese colonial period. On the surface,
the Act seems to acknowledge and protect the rights of
unionisation and labour movements by workers. However,
the Act was actually meant to regulate strike activities more
than to facilitate labour’s interests. After 1945, particularly
due to the enactment of Martial Law, the rights of labour
movements were prohibited for four decades until 1987.
Under the Leninist state corporatism practiced by the KMT,
nation-wide unions as well as those in state-owned enter-
prises were tightly controlled and supervised by either the
Party itself or ethics offices (zhengfengshi) in firms or com-
panies. These puppet unions effectively monitored workers’
activities, promoted candidates of the KMT in political elec-
tions, and served as the propaganda machine of the Party or
the capitalists—everything, in fact, but promoting the inter-
ests of their own members on matters such as wages or work-
ing conditions. It was only with the liberalisation of the
regime at the end of the 1980s that workers were able to
participate in various kinds of social movements, and the
general public became aware, through the mass media, of
the function of independent unions.
The enactment of the Labour Standard Law in 1984 and
gradual changes in political culture contributed to the emer-
gence of independent labour unions from the 1980s onward.
After the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, labour activism
reached its high point in 1988 and 1989 with numerous
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This paper studies how the general public in Taiwan evaluates the power of unions and which groups of the
population support stronger unionisation. We intend to compare changes in attitudes toward union strength in two
ways. First, we examine whether macro-economic or political dynamics created changes in attitudes. Secondly, we
analyse the direct effects of four types of independent variables on attitudes toward unions (individual or collective
level, short-term or long-term), including gender, age, ethnicity, and education. Using four waves of the Taiwan Social
Change Survey conducted between 1990 and 2005, we find that support for stronger unions rose markedly between
2000 and 2005, expressing a higher awareness of the role of unions in labour relations, especially in the context of
economic crisis or lower economic growth.
strikes, petitions, sit-ins, and street demonstrations for vari-
ous causes, including overtime pay, year-end bonuses, and
working conditions. Many new independent unions were es-
tablished, and some existing KMT or management-con-
trolled unions turned into independent organisations. Soon
afterward, however, the KMT started to repress independ-
ent unions by indicting union activists and blocking workers’
strikes when then President Lee Teng-hui, under pressure
from the conservative wing of the KMT, appointed retired
military general Hau Pei-tsun as Premier. In addition, the
Taiwanese economy’s restructuring and an increasingly flex-
ible labour market created new challenges for the Taiwanese
labour movement.
The sudden lifting of Martial Law in 1987 opened up polit-
ical space for Taiwan’s civil society. Looking closely at the
development of labour unions in Taiwan, however, even
after the end of Martial Law, many labour unions in the pub-
lic sector were still controlled by the KMT. Workers in the
public sector enjoyed relatively good labour conditions, in-
cluding job security, reasonable working hours, and retire-
ment benefits. Class-consciousness was therefore relatively
weak in public sector unions, and many unions took the road
to autonomy only when they began facing the challenge of
public sector privatisation in the 1990s. (2)
At the turn of the 1990s, the protests of unions in state-
owned-enterprises became a major force in Taiwan’s labour
movement. For instance, in November 1989, a group of
unions from public enterprises organised an “anti-privatisa-
tion” street demonstration. In May 1993, more than 10,000
workers from 14 public enterprises participated in demon-
strations for “saving public enterprises and the common
good of all citizens.” In 1996, public enterprises launched a
“Mayday for work” demonstration.
After the DPP became the ruling party in 2000, the labour
movement succeeded in obtaining some legal reforms that,
for example, allowed for more than one national federation
of unions, the passage of the Protection for Workers Incur-
ring Occupational Accidents Act, the Gender Equality in
Employment Act, and the Protective Act for Mass Redun-
dancy of Employees. But even though the DPP had long
been friendly to unions and a few activists were recruited
into the new governmental body, the business lobby man-
aged to limit union efforts and increase its own influence on
the new administration. As a result, the labour movement
failed to promote substantial liberal legal reform under the
DPP government. (3)
If the recognised role of the labour movement or unionisa-
tion is to promote the economic or political interests of indi-
vidual unions or workers, union and working class conscious-
ness remains an abstraction until it is embodied by workers’
actions. Unionisation or collective action also reflects the de-
gree of respect and tolerance of a democratic society toward
voluntary resistance activities of civil society against the state
or the capitalists. On many occasions, labour unions also
participate in other social movements to express their con-
cern and support for other civil and social rights, such as
women’s or environmental rights. This study therefore aims
to consider what the general public thinks of labour unions
in Taiwan, and who supports unionisation. Using four waves
of the Taiwan Social Change Survey (Taiwan shehui bian-
qian qiben diaocha), we will study how Taiwanese have
viewed unions during the various phases of the liberalisation
and democratisation era since 1987. Many factors may be as-
sociated with the public reaction toward unions, including a
respondent’s family background, social and economic status,
and political orientation. Using data from different time
points, we examine whether those individual factors provide
consistent effects within different political and/or economic
contexts.Li terature rev iew and theoretical  f ramework
Public opinion not only reflects public attitudes toward cer-
tain issues, but also provides inspiration for academic debate
Union members from a state-owned-enterprise raise
their fists and shout slogans during a demonstration in
the streets of Taipei on 1 May 2009 to protest the
deteriorating job market. 
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and suggestions for public policies, whether conservative or
liberal, progressive or abiding by the status quo. (4) Social or-
ganisations may thus be able to use the results of opinion sur-
veys to push for the reform of public policies. The state ap-
paratus has frequently posited as an absolute that labour
strikes disrupt social order, and that union activities impede
normal business operations and general economic develop-
ment, but few studies have analysed public attitudes toward
labour unions and possible changes in Taiwan. In the follow-
ing, we briefly review the findings of previous studies con-
cerning this topic in the Western World.
In a trend study on the eve of a crucial episode in the post-
war history of labour unions in Western Europe, Roiser and
Little show that British polls consistently showed strong pub-
lic support for trade unions, but that more than half of union
members themselves believed that trade unions were “too
powerful.” (5) In 1981, the proportion of union support was
61 percent, which was even higher than the rate a decade
earlier (51 percent), and a high percentage of respondents
still agreed that having trade unions was “a good thing in
Britain.” (6) The British public therefore seemed to support
the existence of labour unions but not the over-expansion of
union power. This opinion poll may explain why Prime Min-
ister Margaret Thatcher could bring about privatisation in
the public sector—as in the case of British Telecom—and
close coal mines despite fierce resistance and a long strike
(1984-1985), and thus undermine the unions that were an
important support for the Labour Party.
In the US, Tracy Chang used the 1991 General Social Sur-
vey to analyse the impact of various demographic factors and
occupational characteristics on social attitudes toward labour
unions. (7) Her study pointed out that ethnic minorities, the
working or self-employed class, those holding lower socioe-
conomic status, the unemployed and those experiencing ca-
reer demotions tended to expect stronger influence from
labour unions. She also found that neither educational
achievement nor gender showed any significant effect on at-
titudes toward labour unions.
We shall use the findings from these previous studies as the
basic guidelines for our analysis. However, public attitudes
are not solely determined by individual and objective factors.
Changes at the societal level and collective ideology play an
important role in people’s perception as well. To examine
the various causes of political attitudes, we will refer to the
socio-psychological concept of “public mood” as defined by
Rahn, Kroeger, and Kite. (8) They suggest a two-by-two ty-
pology to study the subject (short-term/long-term; individ-
ual/collective), and then classify the causes of public mood
into four categories. (9) For individual and short-term causes,
they include personal experience and private mood. Individ-
ual experience consists of involvement in political activities,
economic conditions, past dealings with government agen-
cies, and criminal records. There are also long-term factors
at the individual level, including personal socio-demographic
characteristics such as age, sex, race/ethnicity, educational
background, and class position. The authors also suggest
that psychological reactions may have enduring effects on
personal political attitudes. (10) The factors in this category in-
clude personality and satisfaction with life.
Public mood is also affected by aggregate factors, including
macro-economic performance and evaluations of politicians.
These factors have short-term effects and might change
when an economic recession ends or other leaders come to
power. There are other collective elements with long-term
and consistent effects on public attitudes, including national
identity, patriotism, party orientation, and ideology. Their
empirical findings generally support the hypotheses.
The merit of this typology is that it takes psychological fac-
tors into account simultaneously with personal and collective
factors. As public attitudes represent subjective evaluations
by individuals, their personal mood and feelings should be
considered in the analysis. Another merit of the typology is
that it considers both short-term and long-term factors. The
short-term factors represent temporary conditions or experi-
ences, which change when individuals take new positions or
after political leaders step down. However, the distinction
between short-term and long-term factors may not be as
clear-cut as the typology shows. For instance, attitudes to-
ward political leaders (a short-term factor) may actually be
related to ideology regarding the power of the state (a long-
term factor), and individual class position (a short-term fac-
tor) may also change with improvement or deterioration in
the labour market. Mainly based on Rahn et al., our typol-
ogy for the present study is listed in Figure 1. But unlike
those authors, our paper will study changes in political atti-
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tudes and their causes to provide a more time-reliable ex-
planatory model. We will also examine interactions between
years and some key factors to resolve ambiguities in the last-
ing effects of short-term or long-term causes.
Attitudes  toward  labour unions :  Individual  factors
We will first discuss factors at the individual level, followed
by political and economic changes over a period of 20 years
in Taiwan.
Individual short-term factors mainly pertain to job status, the
indicators of which include achievements (such as earnings
or prestige) and job requirements (such as skills, expertise,
or authority). Different jobs also imply different work cul-
tures shaping their self-identification and ideology. (11) These
characteristics as a whole might be represented by broad cat-
egories—that is, occupation or class.
Classifying the occupational structure into the blue-collar
(manual) and white-collar (non-manual) dichotomy has been
a common usage in cross-national studies of occupational seg-
regation. (12) While blue-collar employees work primarily in
manual labour, white-collar employees mainly deal with clients
or customers. According to Taiwanese official statistics, more
than half of union members are in the mining and manufac-
turing industries. (13) Thus it is reasonable to expect that blue-
collar workers would be more likely to support stronger unions
than those holding white-collar jobs. There are also differ-
ences within white-collar jobs. Higher-level white collar jobs
require more human capital and have more autonomy, and
work performance is not judged by quantity or on a short-term
basis. Lower-level white collar workers, on the other hand, are
mostly hired in service or routine jobs that couple low pay
with long working hours and pressure. Professionals and other
higher-ranking white collar workers rely more on their own
qualifications in labour markets, while lower-level workers
have to rely on a collective voice to improve work conditions.
The latter would therefore more likely support a stronger
union than the more privileged white-collar workers.
In addition to the polarised classes—the bourgeoisie (em-
ployers) and the proletariat (the employed) used by Marx to
characterise class relations under capitalism—we add the pe-
tite bourgeoisie because of the importance of this category
in Taiwan’s economic regime. Theoretically we would ex-
pect the working class to show stronger support for union
power than the other classes. However, reviewing the eco-
nomic development and the lives of the working class in Tai-
wan, one researcher observed in the 1980s that there is con-
siderable mobility between workers, the petite bourgeoisie,
and those working in family businesses. (14) Following her ar-
gument, we could expect an equivalent level of support for
strong labour unions among the petite bourgeoisie and em-
ployed workers. In contrast, Chu has concluded that because
of the possibilities of moving upward in their careers, the
Taiwanese working class lacks class consciousness and shows
little commitment to unions and their actions. (15) However,
even if some workers do have the chance to become a boss
or self-employed, their economic welfare may not signifi-
cantly improve because of the meagre profits earned in a
highly competitive market. (16) We therefore expect that rela-
tive to employers, the working class and the self-employed
should support strong unions.
In a departure from previous works, this paper also studies
the attitudes of those who are not in the labour market, such
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University Press, 1987, pp. 73-79.
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Figure 1. Causes Affecting Public Attitudes toward Union Power
Short-term Long-term
Individual 
Causes
• Objective economic situations: occupational categories, and class
positions.
• Individual identity: class identity.
• Social-demographic characteristics: 
gender, ethnicity, age, and education.
Collective 
Causes
• Economic conditions: unemployment rate.
• Political conditions: Martial Law lifting, direct presidential election,
turnover of the ruling party.
• Emergence of labor movement.
• Ideology: attitude toward social welfare 
policy.
• Party orientation.
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as homemakers, the unemployed, and adult students. As this
group is rather heterogeneous, we do not have a specific hy-
pothesis concerning the attitudes of homemakers or students
toward union power. However, as stressed by Chang, re-
spondents who are unemployed significantly support
unions. (17) As they find themselves in a weak position in the
labour market, they can be expected to side against business
and support strong unions.
Subjective class identity reflects the psychological mood of
people, which is not solely decided by objective class posi-
tion. Lamont and Hodson both find that the working class
individuals they interviewed possessed strong self-respect
and pride in working to make a living. (18) Skeggs, who has
studied British women in the service industry, found that
because of the nature of their jobs, many identified them-
selves with the working class while also accepting the life
orientations of the middle class. (19) Based on these results,
we expect that people identifying themselves as working
class would more likely support labour unions becoming
stronger.
Individual long-term factors mainly relate to ascribed char-
acteristics, including demographic factors such as age and
sex, and those representing family background, such as fa-
ther’s ethnicity. In the context of Taiwan, people who expe-
rienced rule under Martial Law might be less likely to sup-
port collective action to avoid unrest. In addition to this his-
torical factor, life-course development may also play a role.
As job stability and earnings are in general positively corre-
lated with seniority, older workers are expected to be less
enthusiastic about stronger unions than their younger coun-
terparts.
As the previous study indicates, it is not easy to identify the
relationship between gender and attitude toward unions, (20)
which might be a result of occupational characteristics.
Blue-collar workers are primarily male, with women heavily
concentrated in the service industries. There is another ex-
planation for the possible difference in attitudes between
women and men. A study by Ho Ming-sho suggests that the
masculinity underlining the process of union solidarity for-
mation might make female workers feel uneasy and discrim-
inated against in unions. (21) Thus, we hypothesise that
women may react less positively to the function of unions
and offer less support to unions than men.
In Taiwan, ethnicity is another important factor contributing
to political behaviour and attitudes. (22) On the one hand,
ethnicity is significantly related to job location. For histori-
cal and political reasons, mainlanders (waishengren) are
more likely to work in the public sector (governmental agen-
cies or state-owned enterprises) than Taiwanese, (23) while
Hokkiens (or Hoklo [fulao], Minnanren) and Hakkas
(kejia) are disproportionately represented in the manufac-
turing and primary industries and commerce as well as
among the self-employed. Historical experience might also
be an important factor affecting attitudes toward public is-
sues in Taiwan’s case. The long-term one-party rule of the
KMT resulted in a high percentage of mainlanders in high-
ranking official positions, particularly in central government.
Because unions usually challenged state policy, mainlanders
should be less likely to support unions, especially before the
regime transition in 2000.
As to the association between education and attitudes to-
ward unionisation, we expect that the more people are edu-
cated, the better they can appreciate the social power of civil
society and sympathise with the position of the disadvan-
taged in the labour markets. Thus higher educational
achievement should be positively associated with support for
stronger union power.
Attitudes toward labour  unions :  Coll ect i ve  factors
Based on the scheme of Rahn et al., (24) we treat aggregate
economic and political contexts as short-term factors, and
ideology and partisanship as long-term factors. Taiwan has
experienced unprecedented political and social transforma-
tion since the second half of the 1980s, including the lifting
of Martial Law, democratic transition, the presidential direct
election, and party alternation in power. We provide a brief
review of these changes below.
In general, Taiwan’s democratic transition can be roughly di-
vided into four periods: liberalisation (late 1980 to June
1987), a period of uncertainty (July 1987 to July 1988),
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democratic transition (July 1988 to December 1994), and
democratic consolidation (1995 and beyond). (25) During the
end of the first phase, thousands of street demonstrations
were held by various social groups, including environmental-
ists, women’s movement activists, aboriginals, farmers, and
teachers. (26) Labor movements started in 1988 and soon
reached a peak within a few months. The former Director
of the Council of Labour Affairs publicly remarked that he
was shocked by the series of labour strikes occurring in the
late 1980s, a development unthinkable under the control of
the KMT corporatist regime previously. (27)
On the one hand, as mentioned above concerning the UK,
if labour strikes against privatisation do not attract public sup-
port, we would expect that at the peak of protests against pri-
vatisation (especially in the mid 2000s), the public would
show less support for union power. On the other hand, bad
economic conditions create tight job markets for workers.
Earnings, upward mobility, and job vacancies are all reduced
or held back when a recession or slack business occurs.
Many workers may even lose their jobs after downsizing or
plant closures. It is therefore reasonable to expect that pub-
lic support for union power would be stronger in a period of
economic downturn than in times of economic prosperity.
According to Rahn et al., public attitudes of individual re-
spondents do not vary only with objective factors or individ-
ual characteristics. (28) There are also collective mentalities
that create consistent attitudes toward certain parties, poli-
cies, or beliefs. Party orientation is one of them, as is ideol-
ogy. Therefore we will first discuss the impact of party ori-
entation.
The first presidential direct election in Taiwan was held in
1996, and Lee Teng-hui, the KMT candidate, won the elec-
tion. Although there were uncertainties and even backlashes
in the early 1990s, this period opened up an era of demo-
cratic consolidation by being more liberal, socially and polit-
ically speaking. In the 2000 election, Chen Shui-bian, the
DPP candidate, won the presidential election, defeating the
KMT, which had been the ruling party since the end of
World War II.
The KMT had suppressed and controlled civic organisa-
tions, including labour unions, until the end of Martial Law
in 1987, leading to strong criticism of the regime among
workers. Some labour activists, such as members of the Tai-
wan Labour Front, had close relations with the DPP in the
process of democratic transition. We would therefore expect
that when the KMT was in power, supporters of the KMT
or other parties relatively favourable to unification with
China or disinclined toward independence would be less
likely to support strong labour union power. When the DPP
was in power in 2000, some former labour activists had the
chance to become government officials and influence the
state apparatus from within. But their attitudes toward union
organisations and labour actions may have changed because
of their new political positions in the regime. Thus, we ex-
pect that supporters of the DPP or other pro-Taiwan-inde-
pendence parties were mostly likely to support unions when
the KMT was in power, but that they might have been re-
luctant to support unions when the DPP was in power.
Not everyone has consistent views regarding policies or so-
cial events, but some do hold ideological opinions about gov-
ernmental policies. Opinions regarding the welfare system
might be a good case in point. In general, individuals who
oppose excessive state spending on family, health, or unem-
ployment subsidies are labelled as conservatives. These peo-
ple are also inclined to believe in a laisser-faire economy and
free competition in labour markets. In contrast, people who
hold liberal viewpoints are likely to attribute personal misfor-
tunes to structural factors and support a larger share of the
budget for those in need. Following this logic, we would ex-
pect that people who support a welfare system would likely
support stronger unions, while people who believe that wel-
fare policies reduce the drive for success would give little
support to a stronger collective voice (viewed as a threat to
“normal” business operations).
Interactions between coll ect i ve  andind ividual  facto rs
Theoretically, public attitudes toward political issues, lead-
ers, or certain policies would be likely to change under vari-
ous external political or economic conditions. In the case of
opinions regarding union power in particular, we expect that
the effect of personal job position and party orientation
would be contingent on political and/or social conditions. In
Figure 2 we list changes in economic and political conditions
for the past 28 years. There are four dots specified on the
X axis in Figure 2, which respectively represent the year of
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the survey data (see the next section) used in the analysis.
Although there was no lack of turmoil, the economy grew
very rapidly before 1990, but the growth rate has remained
below 8 percent since then, and has averaged below 6 per-
cent since 1998. Generally speaking, real earnings steadily
increased during this period up until 2000, when they
started to stagnate. However, workers also experienced in-
creased unemployment after the mid-1990s, and the situa-
tion deteriorated further after 2000. Taiwanese export-led
economic development has been heavily affected by global
economic and political events during this period.
The year 1990 marked the transition to political democracy
in Taiwan, and also a global economic recession due to the
abrupt rise in oil prices during the first Gulf War. Taiwanese
witnessed much better economic conditions in 1995 in terms
of CPI (consumer price index)-adjusted earnings and rela-
tively stable economic growth, but also experienced an in-
creasing unemployment rate. In 2000, the DPP made his-
tory in Taiwanese politics by winning the presidential elec-
tion. Unfortunately this year was also the beginning of a
short period of recession due to the bursting of the dot-com
bubble in the US, and unemployment rapidly increased in
Taiwan. While the general economic performance was good
in 2005, real earnings for workers remained unchanged. 
Turning to the interactions, we expect the impact of occupation
on personal attitudes toward unions to vary in different survey
years. We expect that lower-ranking workers, blue-collar, or
lower white-collar workers, would strongly support an increase
in union influence in years of poor economic performance such
as 2000 and 2005. We would not expect the attitudes of
higher-level white-collar workers to change over time, as they
are less likely to rely on unions to improve their benefits. 
As to the interactions between class position and time pe-
riod, we have two contradictory hypotheses. From the polit-
ical side, we expect to find significant class differences in at-
titudes toward unions in 1990 and 1995, but these would
probably diminish in 2000 and 2005. The main reason is
the traditionally higher support for the DPP or other pro-
Taiwan-independence parties among the petite bourgeoisie
and the working class. As the DPP became the ruling party
in 2000 and remained in this position after the subsequent
election, these two classes would reduce their support for
stronger unionisation. However, on the economic side we
expect the working class to continue to support stronger
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Figure 2. Trends of Political Transition, Economic Performance 
Graph 2. and Labor Compensations in Taiwan, 1980-2007
Source: National Accounts Yearbook, 2008; Price Statistics Monthly, No. 408, 444; On-line Database of Earnings and Productivity Statistics
(http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=1135&ctNode=3253; access date: 6 November 2008); and Yearbook of Manpower Survey Results, 2008.
Note: The DPP took the place of the KMT as the ruling party in 2000 to 2008, which is marked in grey.
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union power during the economic downturns—that is, in
2000 and 2005.
The third item of interaction is between year and party pref-
erence. As we discuss above, in addition to pro-democracy
movements, the DPP had been a major force in labour move-
ments during the Martial Law era. Compared with the
KMT, the DPP had strong ties with union organisations and
industrial labour unions in several state-owned enterprises.
Supporters of the DPP are expected to have wished to see
greater union power during the rule of the KMT. However,
when the DPP won the elections in 2000 and re-elections in
2004, its voters are likely to have shown support for the new
regime and are less likely to have supported strong unions.Data,  analyt ical  approachesand variables
The data used in the analyses come from four waves of the
Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) conducted in 1990
(with a sample size of 2,531 respondents), 1995 (2,093),
2000 (1,960), and 2005 (2,171). TSCS started the nation-
wide sampling survey in 1984. In the four surveys, partici-
pants were asked to consider whether the power and influ-
ence of workers’ unions should be greater or less. (29) Since
respondents were sampled differently in each survey, the
combined data is suitable for comparing changes in attitude
over time. (30) By including the age groups in the analytic
models for each year we can test both age and cohort ef-
fects. (31)
This paper intends to compare changes in attitude toward
union strength in two ways. We first examine whether
macro-economic or political dynamics created changes in at-
titudes. The year 1990 is considered a period of democratic
transformation. Political democracy increased in 1995 and
further consolidated in 2000 when the DPP replaced the
KMT as the ruling party. The DPP was still the ruling party
in 2005 and experienced strong anti-privatisation movements
the year before. We expect the general supportive attitude
toward labour unions to have reached a peak in 1990 and to
have diminished over the years.
The second approach focuses on the direct effect of inde-
pendent variables on attitudes toward the influence of
unions. Following the typology of Rahn et al., we consider
four types of variables in the analysis (individual or collec-
tive level, short-term or long-term) and for individual, long-
term variables we include gender, age, ethnicity, and educa-
tion. Respondents are classified into three categories of eth-
nicity based on father’s ethnic background: Hakka,
Hokkien, and mainlander. Educational achievements consist
of four categories: primary school or less, attended or fin-
ished junior high school, attended or graduated from senior
high school, and attended or graduated from college or uni-
versity or a higher degree.
As to individual short-term factors, we include occupational
and class position and subjective class identification. There
are three categories to represent occupational structure:
higher-status white-collar jobs, lower-status white collar, and
blue-collar. Concerning class structure, there are four groups:
employers, petite bourgeoisie, the working class, and non-
employed (the unemployed, students, and full-time home-
makers). Subjective class identification also has four types:
lower class, working class, lower-middle/middle, and upper-
middle/upper.
For collective, long-term factors, we include partisanship and
ideology in the models. The KMT and DPP are the two
major parties in Taiwan. Over the last 20 years there have
emerged a few smaller parties, e.g., the New Party, the Peo-
ple-First Party, and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). The
political ideology of the first two is close to that of the KMT,
while the TSU has allied with the DPP. We thus combine
supporters of the KMT, New Party, and People-First Party as
Pan-Blue (fanlan), and those voting DPP, TSUP or other
pro-Taiwan-independence parties as Pan-Green (fanlü). The
third category includes respondents who did not identify with
either the Pan-Blue or the Pan-Green.
The other aggregate and fixed factor deals with ideology and
opinions regarding the welfare system. In all four surveys the
respondents were asked to comment on the following assump-
tion: If there is good social security, people will work less hard.
We include one variable to represent macro and short-term
factors. Since there are only four time points in the analysis,
using the national unemployment rate for each year will not
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29. There are more members in occupational unions than in industrial unions in Taiwan. The
main purpose of occupational unions is to handle labour and health insurance for mem-
bers. However, we do not think the difference in union membership should affect the
validity of this question and the analytical results for two reasons. First, most respon-
dents were not members of either occupational or industrial unions, according to the
results of the Taiwan Social Change Survey in 2005 (Ying-Hwa Chang, Yang-Chih Fu
[eds.], Taiwan Social Change Survey Report, No. 5-1, Taipei, Institute of Sociology,
Academia Sinica, 2006: 332). Secondly, except for the survey in 2005, all earlier surveys
put this question in a cluster of questions concerning the respondents’ general social
and economic attitudes, such as their opinions regarding the welfare system or toward
the government’s intervention in economic affairs. The respondents were expected to
express a general view regarding the strength of unions but not regarding the unions
they belonged to. We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this issue to our atten-
tion.
30. Glenn Firebaugh, Seven Rules for Social Research, Princeton, Princeton University Press,
2008, p.181.
31. For readers unfamiliar with statistics, the cohort effect is equal to adding the effects of
age to period effects.
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show much variation. Instead, the paper uses the regional
unemployment rate to measure changes in economic condi-
tions over time and in different areas. The variable is con-
structed by identifying the registered address of respondents
and matching it with the regional (city or county) unemploy-
ment rate. (32) The same method is applied to all four surveys.
Referring to Tracy Chang’s findings that the unemployed
significantly support union power in the US, (33) we expected
similar trends in Taiwan.
The second and third approaches share the same multino-
mial logistic model in the analysis. For the second approach
we are interested in the direct effect of respective independ-
ent variables and will examine the odds ratios of respective
variables only. The third approach focuses on the interaction
between year and individual job position and party prefer-
ence (explained below). We compare the odds ratios of in-
teraction effects together with main effects.Findings
Frequency di str ibut ion of  att itudes  towardunionisation over t ime
As to the question of attitudes regarding union power, Fig-
ure 3 shows that Taiwanese consistently agreed that labour
unions’ influence should be stronger. In comparison, a far
lower percentage of respondents supported less or much less
influence for unions; even at its peak in 2000, this percent-
age was only 10.6 percent. This result should be very en-
couraging for union members or labour movement activists,
even if another substantial proportion of respondents indi-
cated either ignorance of or indifference to this issue by
choosing “no comment” (in any case, this item decreased
from 31.9 percent in 1990 to 20.5 percent in 2005). Public
support for stronger unions peaked in 2005, reaching a level
even higher than in 1990, just three years after society had
been relieved of the authoritarian rule of the KMT.
Multinomia l  logis t ic  analysi s:  Maineffec ts  of  independent  variabl es
Table 1 lists descriptive statistics of independent variables
used in the multivariate analysis. Since most results can be
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32. We are aware that respondents may not live in the same place as where they registered
for voting or other purposes. According to a previous study, various studies have found
the mismatch varying from 10 to 12 percent (Hsing-Yi Chang et al., “Comparisons
among the Household Registry, Stay, and Migrated Populations in Taiwan: Evidence from
the Data of 2001 Taiwan National Health Interview Survey,” Survey Research, vol. 14,
2003, pp. 5-29).
33. T. Chang, “A Structural Model of Race, Gender, Class, and Attitudes toward Labour
Unions,” art. cit., p. 6.
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Figure 3. Public Attitudes toward Union Power in 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005
Source: Taiwan Social Change Survey.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables
Unit: persons; %         S.D. : Standard Deviation 
Average 1990 1995 2000 2005
Number of respondents 2,115 1,597 1,573 1,757
Independent variables
Gender
Female 50.2 49.8 49.5 50.2 51.5
Male 49.8 50.2 50.5 49.8 48.5
Age (mean; S.D.) 39.9 (13.2) 36.9 (11.1) 40.4 (12.5) 42.0 (13.8) 41.3 (14.9)
Ethnicities
Hokkien of Taiwan 74.0 74.2 70.5 78.9 72.4
Hakka of Taiwan 13.1 13.6 15.1 9.1 14.2
Mainlander 13.0 12.2 14.4 12.0 13.4
Education
Primary school or less 26.3 30.4 26.7 28.5 18.8
Junior high school 14.8 16.8 16.0 14.4 11.7
Senior high school 36.1 36.3 37.7 35.0 35.5
College or higher 22.8 16.5 19.7 22.1 33.9
Occupations
Higher white-collar 12.6 11.6 12.2 14.2 12.6
Lower white-collar 31.8 29.1 31.1 29.4 37.9
Blue-collar 27.8 26.6 30.6 30.3 24.3
Non-employed 27.9 32.7 26.1 26.1 25.2
Classes
Employer 9.3 8.7 14.8 8.3 5.9
Petite bourgeoisie 11.5 14.9 9.1 12.6 8.7
Labor 51.3 43.6 50.0 53.1 60.3
Non-employed 27.9 32.7 26.1 26.1 25.2
Subjective class identification
Lower class 8.0 9.2 8.9 8.3 5.3
Working class 20.2 27.7 17.4 20.2 13.8
Lower-middle or middle class 58.2 52.5 62.4 60.3 59.4
Upper-middle or upper class 13.7 10.6 11.4 11.2 21.5
Party orientation
Pan-Blue 35.3 36.8 54.5 30.7 19.9
Pan-Green 17.4 6.1 16.5 35.0 16.1
Others 47.4 57.1 29.0 34.3 64.0
Whether in agreement with the saying:
“People will be less willing to work hard if there is good social
welfare.”
Agree 25.5 14.6 21.8 30.3 37.6
No comment 5.2 7.5 5.7 3.8 3.4
Disagree 69.3 77.9 72.5 65.9 59.1
Unemployment rate (mean [%]; S.D.) 2.6 (1.1) 1.7 (.4) 1.9 (.4) 3.0 (.7) 4.1 (.1)
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easily interpreted, we discuss selective find-
ings only. As we would expect, the average
education level has increased over the last 20
years in Taiwan. Consistent with the transfor-
mation of the employment structure in Tai-
wan, the proportion of white-collar workers in-
creased over the years, especially among the
lower-ranking category. The proportion of
blue-collar workers remained an average of 28
percent of total employed persons during this
period. As to distribution among different
classes, the proportion of capitalists or petite
bourgeoisie decreased, while the greatest em-
ployment is found in the private sector. Table
1 also shows that the KMT or Pan-Blue has
lost supporters over years, while Pan-Green or
DPP supporters increased in terms of per-
centage. However even the Pan-Greens expe-
rienced a shrinkage of membership in 2005.
The multinomial logistic analysis combines
the data from the surveys conducted in
1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. The depend-
ent variable is the public attitude toward the
influence of labour unions. We simplified
the original five items into three (should this
influence be greater, less, or remain the
same, and no comment), and we used the
second item as the comparison group. Thus,
when the coefficients of independent vari-
ables are positive (or negative), it means
that the respondents with those characteris-
tics are inclined to support greater (or less)
union power.
According to Table 2, men, older people,
and those who believe that good social wel-
fare makes people lazy all have lower proba-
bilities of supporting strong unions. The work-
ing class and Pan-Green supporters are more
likely to favour powerful unions than their op-
posites (upper-middle/upper class, and Pan-
Blue supporters). As to the time effect, after
controlling for other variables, Taiwanese
seemed less likely to support strong union
power in 2000 and 2005 than in 1990.
As to who is more or less likely to show in-
difference or unfamiliarity with the issue,
the results in Table 2 show that older peo-
ple, those with little formal education, those
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Figure 4. Added Odds Ratios of Main and Interaction Effects of the
Figure 4. Support for Stronger Union Power by Occupation, Class, and
Figure 4. Party Inclination in 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005
Source: Taiwan Social Change Survey.
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not belonging to the upper-middle/upper class, or those who
do not favour any major political parties are more likely to
express no comment for this question than their counter-
parts. People in socially disadvantaged positions seem to be
more reserved or feel less interested in revealing their atti-
tudes on this matter. In contrast, men and relatively conser-
vative respondents are less likely to answer “no comment.”
Interaction  between year ,  job,  c lass ,  andparty preference
In this part we discuss the results of the second half of Table
2. Concerning support for union power, most of the interac-
tion appears between party preference and year. The “no
comment” (vs. less power) item was not significant, meaning
that at the very least there was not any growing indifference
over time. Transforming the sum of odds ratios into graphs
provides a better representation of support for greater vs. less
union power. (34)
Figure 4 presents graphs showing the interaction between year
and occupational categories, class, and party orientations. The
added odds ratios (statistics on the Y axis) are the sum of the
main effects of year and the predicting variables and the inter-
action effects between them. Thus the graphs represent the
likelihood of supporting more union power as opposed to less
power, considering both direct and interaction effects.
In Graph A, the higher white-collar workers are used as the
compared group. (35) For those currently not in the labour mar-
kets, the odds for supporting stronger unions increase over time.
The added odds are three times higher than for upper non-man-
ual workers in 2005. The unemployment rate reached 4 percent
in that year, higher than in the previous three survey years (see
Table 1 and Figure 2). Bad job market conditions may have
contributed to greater support for unions in the less privileged
group. Both blue-collar and lower white-collar workers were also
more likely than higher white-collar workers to approve of more
powerful unions in any survey year, except in 1990.
Graph B shows the results of interaction between year and
class position. The disparity of added odds ratios between
the reference and other groups is much larger than in Graph
A. The effect of class is more obvious than that of occupa-
tion. Clearly, compared with employers, the petite bour-
geoisie have much larger added odds of supporting greater
union power in all years. The total odds of the working class
are even higher. The results seem to be consistent with
Gates’s observation (36) that the inter-mobility between work-
ers and self-employed/small owners makes the two groups
equally sympathetic to unions.
The last graph in Figure 4 shows the results of interaction
between year and party orientation. The results are rather
distinct, as the three lines are almost parallel with one an-
other. Respondents voting for other parties have odds less
than two times higher for supporting stronger union power
than those voting Pan-Blue. The odds for the Pan-Green
supporters are even higher. However the added odds of
supporting stronger unionisation decreased for both DPP
voters and voters with fixed party preference since 2000.
We shall discuss the implications of these results in the final
section.Conclus ion and discussion
Many studies have focused on how economic and political
transformation affects unionisation and labour movements in
newly-industrialised societies such as East Asia. (37) Among
these, Taiwan has gradually moved from Martial Law to
democracy. However, an institutionalised electoral political
system and individual political freedom do not guarantee dis-
tributional justice in the economy and the protection of so-
cial rights. This is where labour unions and their activities
become so important in obtaining justice and improving wel-
fare for members. At the beginning of this paper we quoted
a remark by a high-ranking DPP official to illustrate the hos-
tility of any ruling party toward labour strikes. It is ironic,
since the DPP had been a major force advocating au-
tonomous unions and the right to labour actions when it was
the opposition party before 2000. While politicians tend to
cite public attitudes in denouncing union movements, this
paper uses empirical data to show how people really think.
According to the results of the frequency distribution, the
majority of respondents wished unions to be more influential
in all four survey years. Even though the figures are lower
than those in Britain (51 percent in 1981 (38)) or in the US
(70 percent approval rate between the mid-1980s and
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34. The odds ratio compares whether the probability of a certain event is the same for the
reference (or experimental) group and the compared group (the omitted one). An odds
ratio of 1 means that the probability of an event occurring is equal for both groups. An
odds ratio greater than 1 implies that the event is more likely to occur for the reference
group. Since we add the odds ratios of main effects and interactions together, the added
result might be over 1. Still, the larger the sum of odds ratios, the higher the likelihood
of the event occurring for the reference group.
35. The readers will notice that in all three graphs in Figure 4, the odds ratios for the com-
pared group are the same. By definition, the value for the compared group will always
be zero and only the odds for different years will be left after we add interactions and
main effects.
36. H. Gates, Chinese Working-Class Lives: Getting by in Taiwan, op. cit., p. 9.
37. For a seminal example, see Frederic Deyo, Beneath the Miracle: Labour Subordination
in the New Asian Industrialism, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989.
38. M. Roiser, T. Little, “Public Opinion, Trade Unions and Industrial Relations,” art. cit., p. 5.
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Table 2. Multinomial Logistic Analysis of Public Attitude toward the Influence of Labor Unions
Table 2. (Coding of Dependent Variables: Less=0, Greater=1, No comment=2)
(To be continued)
Independent variables
Coefficient (S.E.) Odds Ratio Coefficient (S.E.) Odds Ratio
Male -.14   (.07) + .87 -.44  (.09) *** .64
Age -.01   (.00) *** .01  (.00) ***
Ethnicities (Mainlander=0)
Hokkien of Taiwan .02   (.10) 1.02 .06  (.12) 1.06
Hakka of Taiwan .05   (.12) 1.05 .05  (.15) 1.05
Education (College or higher=0)
Primary school or less -.10   (.13) .91 .55  (.15) *** 1.74
Junior high school -.09   (.12) .92 .14  (.15) 1.15
Senior high school -.03   (.09) .97 -.03  (.12) .97
Occupations (Higher white-collar=0)
Lower white-collar -.05   (.23) .95 .17  (.28) 1.19
Blue-collar -.18   (.24) .83 -.03  (.29) .97
Non-employed -.33   (.30) .72 .15  (.36) 1.16
Classes (Employer=0)
Petite bourgeoisie .14   (.29) 1.15 .42  (.32) 1.52
Labor .03   (.24) 1.03 -.02  (.28) .98
Non-employed (dropped) (dropped)
Subjective class identification: 
(Upper-middle or upper class=0)
Lower class .06   (.15) 1.06 .68  (.18) *** 1.98
Working class .31   (.12) ** 1.37 .62  (.15) *** 1.86
Lower-middle or middle class .10   (.09) 1.11 .44  (.12) *** 1.56
Party orientation (Pan-Blue=0)
Pan-Green .59   (.31) + 1.81 -.15  (.39) .86
Others .19   (.14) 1.20 .65  (.16) *** 1.92
Whether in agreement with the saying: 
“People will be less willing to work hard if
there is good social welfare.” (Disagree=0)
Agree -.24   (.07) ** .78 -.22  (.09) * .80
No comment .09   (.15) 1.09 .06  (.18) 1.06
Regional unemployment rate (%) -.1E-2 (.07) -.08  (.08)
Survey year (1990=0)
1995 -.36   (.38) .70 .17  (.47) 1.19
2000 -1.02   (.39) ** .36 -.77  (.48) .46
2005 -1.00   (.43) * .37 -.90  (.57) .41
Greater vs. Less No Comment vs. Less
Who Cares for Unions?
2000 (39)), the results are impressive considering the short
history of political democracy and relatively free unionisation
in Taiwan. Majority support held true even with the rather
large proportion of respondents answering “no comment.”
We speculate that support for influential unions means not
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39. Thomas I. Palley, Robert M. Lajeunesse, “Social Attitudes, Labour Law, and Union
Organizing: Toward a New Economics of Union Density,” Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organizations, vol. 62, no.2, 2007, pp. 237-254.
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+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  Source: Taiwan Social Change Survey, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005.
Note: The category of non-employed is dropped in some variables because of the multi-collinearity.
Independent variables
Coefficient (S.E.) Odds Ratio Coefficient (S.E.) Odds Ratio
Interaction terms: 
Survey year × Occupation
(1990 & Higher white-collar=0)
1995 & Lower white-collar -.37  (.31) .69 -.64  (.40) .53
1995 & Blue-collar -.14  (.32) .87 -.11  (.40) .90
1995 & Non-employed .09  (.41) 1.10 -.44  (.49) .64
2000 & Lower white-collar .30  (.30) 1.35 -.16  (.38) .86
2000 & Blue-collar .07  (.31) 1.07 .30  (.38) 1.35
2000 & Non-employed .55  (.40) 1.73 .34  (.48) 1.41
2005 & Lower white-collar -.07  (.29) .93 -.62  (.39) .54
2005 & Blue-collar .20  (.31) 1.22 -.14  (.40) .87
2005 & Non-employed 1.24  (.41) ** 3.47 .61  (.53) 1.85
Survey year × Class
(1990 & Employer=0)
1995 & Petite bourgeoisie -.48  (.39) .62 -.71  (.44) .49
1995 & Labor .15  (.31) 1.16 -.33  (.36) .72
1995 & Non-employed (dropped) (dropped)
2000 & Petite bourgeoisie .25  (.40) 1.28 -.06  (.46) .94
2000 & Labor .34  (.33) 1.40 .04  (.39) 1.04
2000 & Non-employed (dropped) (dropped)
2005 & Petite bourgeoisie .51  (.41) 1.66 .19  (.51) 1.21
2005 & Labor .81  (.33) * 2.25 .55  (.43) 1.74
2005 & Non-employed (dropped) (dropped)
Survey year × Party orientation
(1990 & Pan-Blue=0)
1995 & Pan-Green -.48  (.35) .62 .07  (.45) 1.07
1995 & Others -.05  (.21) .96 -.11  (.23) .89
2000 & Pan-Green -.58  (.34) + .56 .46  (.43) 1.58
2000 & Others -.23  (.21) .79 .28  (.25) 1.32
2005 & Pan-Green -.99  (.36) ** .37 .05  (.48) 1.05
2005 & Others -.39  (.21) + .68 -.18  (.27) .83
Constant term 1.96  (.35) *** -- -.64  (.42) --
Sample size 7,042
Greater vs. Less No Comment vs. Less
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only organising efforts but also legitimate action taken to pro-
tect labour rights. These results should help refute claims by
politicians of public resentment of labour activities and lend
some encouragement to labour activists, unions, and their
members. With economic conditions deteriorating in the
twenty-first century, calls for stronger unions became even
louder in 2005 than the previous three surveys. 
This paper also examines who supports stronger unions. The
results of multivariate analyses show that opinions regarding
strong unions significantly differ among classes. Strong unions
are consistently support by the working class and the petite
bourgeoisie, regardless of political and economic changes.
Even so, the history of political development made party
preference another important factor in explaining public atti-
tudes toward union support in Taiwan. Regardless of which
year we studied, voters for Pan-Green parties were more
likely to desire more influential unions than Pan-Blue voters
or those with other political preferences. However, the odds
decreased in 2000 and 2005. Thus, compared with Pan-
Blue voters, those who voted Pan-Green still supported
stronger unions, but with a declining trend after the DPP
became the ruling party. As we indicate above, some people
supported labour actions as another way to resist the rule of
the KMT. DPP supporters became less enthusiastic when
the KMT was ousted in the 2000 presidential election.
We acknowledge certain limitations in the paper. First, the
term “labour union“ used in the questionnaire is vague. It
might refer to all unions or to the union the respondent be-
longs to. Although we believe respondents were instructed to
give a general view regarding union strength, the answers
would be more valid if future research clearly defines
“labour unions” in the questionnaire.
Secondly, the factors used to explain attitudes toward unions
are mainly the demographic characteristics and socio-eco-
nomic achievements of respondents. We do not have infor-
mation on why they support unions. Future research would
be able to assess whether support for unions is based on per-
sonal experience or is purely support for workers’ power in
issues of rights or economic interests.
Finally, besides asking the degree of support for influential
unions, it would be more informative to know specific as-
pects of union activity that members of the public support.
For instance, respondents may accept union organising but
not militant action against employers. The current study does
not differentiate between support for activities and for the or-
ganisation per se. Thus we do not know if the public really
has negative feelings regarding workers’ strikes or protests, as
politicians have claimed.
Although unionisation has enjoyed strong endorsement from
the public over an extended period (1990 to 2005), the or-
ganisation rate of industrial unions has remained low and has
even been gradually decreasing in Taiwan. About two thirds
of Taiwan’s employed labour force is engaged in the tertiary
sector, but this sector, with a high proportion of women, has
been historically under-organised. While 37 percent of the
work force in the telecommunications and transportation sec-
tors and 15.7 percent of those in manufacturing were union
members by the end of the 1990s, the proportion for the
service sector was only in the single digits. (40) The unbal-
anced recruiting of white-collar workers is not an issue
unique to Taiwan; organising efforts among workers in the
US service sector are also weak. (41) Taiwanese industrial
unions have been concentrated in the traditional industries,
and most of their employees are men. Only a few banks and
governmental agencies have begun to establish independent
unions. Our findings suggest that mobilising workers from
the service sector should be crucial to building up genuine
union power in Taiwan. •
78 N o  2 0 1 0 / 3
40. Web news of Taiwan Labour Front (http://labour.ngo.org.tw/labour-rights-
report/20report/ 1-organizing.htm; access date: 10 February 2010).
41. Rick Fantasia, Kim Voss, Hard Work: Remaking the American Labor Movement, Berkeley,
CA, University of California Press, 2004.
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Glossary
Fanlan 泛藍 Fanlü 泛綠 Fulao 福佬
Hau Pei-tsun 郝柏村 Kejia 客家
Lee Teng-hui 李登輝 Minnanren 閩南人
Taitie gonghui 台鐵工會
Taiwan shehui bianqian qiben diaocha 台灣社會變遷基本調查
Waishengren 外省人 Zhengfengshi 政風室
